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Introduction
Most developing countries do not produce official estimates of potential GDP. As a result, the World Bank has produced its own estimates over the years, adapting the methods used in high-income countries to the developing-country case where data constraints are markedly more binding. This paper describes the derivation of the potential output estimates employed by the World Bank in its macro econometric model for forecasting and policy analysis purposes. The results reported here reflect several years of effort to strengthen the supply-side of the World Bank's macro econometric model, tying estimates of potential growth to the accumulation of factor inputs and the growth of TFP. The paper presents a number of sensitivity scenarios based on different assumptions made in the potential output calculations.
Methodology
The World Bank's macro-econometric model (WBMM) for the Global Economic Prospects (GEP) employs estimates of potential output based on a hybrid production-function approach similar to that used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2001) in the United States, the OECD (2008) , and the European Commission and the Federal Reserve Board (D'Auria and others, 2010; Denis and others 2006) . In this approach, the supply side of GDP is described by a simple Cobb-Douglas function of the form:
where GDP is gross domestic product, K is the capital stock, L is labor employed, and TFP represents total factor productivity. Equation (1) can be rewritten by expressing employment as the product of the workingage population 1564 , the labor force participation rate , and one less the unemployment rate ( ), which gives:
Stating in growth terms, the real GDP growth can be decomposed into the weighted sum of the growth rate of total factor productivity, a contribution of the capital stock growth � ∆ � and a contribution of employment growth �(1 − ) � which gives:
Assuming that all of the capital stock and all of the labor force are fully employed ( and are at their equilibrium values), that all of the services of the available capital stock are used, and that total factor productivity is growing at its trend rate, i.e.
* , gives an expression for the rate of growth of potential * . In other words, if the participation rate and unemployment rate are constant at their equilibrium levels, then they drop out of equation (3) which leaves us with the following equation for the rate of growth of potential output:
Moving back to the representation in levels, the potential * is as follows: * = * ( 1564, * * )
If actual output rises above its potential, i.e. positive output gap, then capacity constraints begin to bind and inflationary pressures build. On the other hand, if the output gap is negative, resources are under-utilized and inflationary pressures subside. Normally, actual GDP (growth) will fluctuate around its estimated potential (growth) path.
Estimating Potential Output
The above decomposition is widely used to in macroeconomic analysis, because it is simple, intuitive and lends itself to straightforward interpretation.
However, its application to developing countries is complicated by data limitations. While the majority of countries publish time series of the gross domestic product and the size of the working age population, data on the capital stock is not widely available, and labor market data (labor force and unemployment) are ill defined and mainly unmeasured in developing economies characterized by wide-spread informal employment and subsistence agriculture.
The following discussion describes how these limitations are dealt with in the World Bank modeling framework. for output and investment come from the WDI, while the working-age population (15 to 64) is transformed from the United Nations database using the WDI-UN manual splice method.
Estimating the capital stock
2 Sensitivity scenarios, reflecting alternative values of the parameter related to the application of the filter, are discussed in section 4. Sensitivity Analysis.
Most developing countries do not have official estimates of the capital stock. The World Bank gets around this shortcoming by estimating the capital stock using a highly simplified version of the perpetual inventory method 3 from investment data (running from 1960 in the case of most countries) and assuming a depreciation rate of 7 percent (IMF 2005) . The same basic methodology has employed for estimating capital stock in developing countries by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and is used by the OECD in its Interlink Model.
Using this methodology, a capital stock ( ) series is generated for each country using the following capital accumulation equation (7).
Because at the starting point (t=0) the capital stock is zero this method under-estimates the capital stock in the early years. To get around this short-coming a two-step procedure is employed. An initial estimate of each countries capital-stock is calculated, and then divided by GDP to derive a preliminary estimate of the capital output ratio for each country. In a steady-state model, with a 7 percent depreciation rate, 90 percent of the steady-state capital stock will have accumulated after 25 years, with 85% of the initial capital having depreciated been depreciated at the point. After 15 years the capital stock will have reached two thirds of its long-term equilibrium level.
Because investment data is not available for most developing countries, a short-time period an initial estimate of the capital stock after 15 years was first calculated, and divided by GDP at that time to generate an estimate of the country's capital output ratio, that is used as an initial approximation of the country's equilibrium capital output ratio. To deal with outliers, if the estimated capital output ratio for a country measured in this way, fell outside the 25 th and 75 th percentile of its income cohort, the estimated capital output ratio was set equal to either the 25 th or 75 th percentile boundary level.
In a second step, this initial estimate of the capital output ratio was multiplied by GDP in time t=0 to derive a non-zero starting point for the capital stock of each country (equation 8). The capital stock for T=1…n was then calculated using equation (7).
3 OECD (2001) provides a comprehensive manual of methods for calculating the capital stock, most relying on disaggregated sectoral investment data, sectoral differentiation in depreciation rates, a careful accounting of the cohort structure of the capital stock and accounting for price changes in capital stock. The method employed here assumes the same depreciation rate for all forms of capital and abstracts from the obsolescence implied by relative price changes over time. See Wolf (1997) for an exposition of simplified capital stock calculations that are nevertheless much more sophisticated than the procedure employed here.
Estimating productivity growth
After the capital stock has been estimated, the total factor productivity can be quantified as a residual using equation 10. Trend total factor productivity * (necessary to estimate the potential product) was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter through spot estimates of TFP (i.e. the Sollow residual) calculated by inverting the production function in level terms.
Because the participation rate and the natural unemployment rate are not observed for most developing countries, these (assumed to be constant) terms were included in the TFP. While this shifts the level of TFP, it does not affect the rate of growth of TFP. Under the assumption of a constant natural rate of unemployment and equilibrium participation rate the second two terms in the bracketed part of equation 3 drop out, leaving equation 3b.
Of course if the natural rate of unemployment or equilibrium participation rates change over time then this will bias our measure TFP. From the perspective of social productivity, however, this bias may not be too serious as it effectively includes as part of the TFP changes in the efficiency with which labor is allocated. Thus a policy measure that improves labor force allocation by reducing the natural rate of unemployment would in this model show up as increased TFP, while in a model with an explicit natural rate of unemployment it would enter there. This treatment has no implications for the estimates of Potential output -merely placing the contribution to potential output of improved labor market conditions into TFP instead of having it more directly measures in the labor input.
The point estimates of TFP are then smoothed using a Hodrik-Prescott filter to calculate trend * . The end-point problem (Mise, Kim, and Newbold, 2005 ) is resolved by assuming that for each country TFP growth from the end of actual data through to 2025 is equal to the country average rate of growth of TFP during the period of 1995-2005 (i.e. excluding the impact of the boom-bust cycle). Table 1 reports estimates of the potential output growth for the world, high-income countries, the Euro Area, developing countries and seven developing-country regions derived using the above methodology, assuming that the share of capital income in output is 30% (data on these shares are not generally available for developing countries) and that the rate of depreciation of capital is 7%. In addition, the lambda parameter in the HodrikPrescot filter was held at 100.
Additional Assumptions and Sensitivity analysis
The tables in Appendix A present alternative estimates of potential output and TFP growth to test the sensitivity of the estimates in Table 1 to different assumptions. Table A presents 9 separate estimates for potential output growth are reported for each developing region, assuming either that capital's share in total income is 50, 30 or 10 percent, and that capital's depreciation rate is 6, 7 or 8 percent. By and large estimates of potential output prove to be very resilient to changes in these assumptions, with potential output growth rates for most regions vary by less than 0.2% from the baseline estimate.
Tables B and C, examine the sensitivity of the estimates to the smoothing factor lambda used in the Hodrick-Prescott filter through the point estimates of TFP. In Table B lambda is set to 50 implying significantly more variation in the trend growth of TFP as compared with Table A where lambda was 100. Despite these differences, the estimates of potential output growth remain broadly the same as in Table A , with the following exceptions:
• Potential GDP growth will be about 0.2% on average faster than in the baseline over all alphas over In Table C , where lambda is set to 150 and trend TFP growth allowed to vary less , potential GDP growth differences are insignificant, except in ECA over the 2000 -2005 period where growth rates across the different values for alpha declines by about 0.3% per annum on average when compared to the baseline forecast. Table 1 reports data for GDP growth, labor force growth and estimates for the rate of growth of capital stock, TFP and potential output growth for the world, high-income countries and the 6 world Bank developing country regions for five distinct periods, 4 in recent history (estimates are also generated back through earlier decades). forecast Note that unless otherwise indicated, growth rates refer to average annual compound rates over the period(s). Also, note that the "first" year in the period under consideration is not really part of the period, but serves as the starting point (i.e. the trough/peak) from which the ensuing compound growth is calculated.
Results

Pre-boom
During the pre-boom period, there was a sharp acceleration in global growth from an average 2.7% over 2000 -2005 to 3.9% on average over the 2005-2007 period (Table 1) . This growth acceleration was a global phenomenon -with both high-income and all developing country regions benefitting. Compared to growth over the previous 5 years, average rates accelerated by 33 percent in high income-and by 51 (54) percent in developing (excluding China) countries respectively.
Boom
More strikingly, the growth rate in the Euro Area more than doubled during the "boom" period, i.e., from 1.5 percent per annum over 2000-2005 to 3.2 percent p.a. over [2005] [2006] [2007] . Among other high income countries, the growth acceleration in Japan was about half as much as in Europe; whereas US growth remained largely unchanged at previous period growth rates. Despite global GDP growth accelerating during the boom (when compared to the pre-boom period), global potential output growth remained unchanged. However, this masks significant divergent developments in potential growth among developing and high-income countries, with potential growth falling in the latter and rising in the former.
In high-income countries, the estimates suggest that slightly faster capital stock growth was not able to offset weaker TFP growth (stagnant labor growth was constant) and overall potential GDP growth declined by 0.4% between the pre-boom and boom periods.
In contrast, potential output growth in developing countries (excluding China) increased from 5.8% (4.3%) in the pre-boom period to 6.8% (5.2%) during the boom period. Once again this acceleration in potential growth among developing regions was widespread, varying between a low 0.3 percentage points in MNA to 0.6% in EAP and 1% and 1.2% in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia respectively.
The acceleration in potential in developing countries was almost entirely explained by capital deepening (faster capital stock growth) as labor supply and TFP growth were either constant or declined somewhat.
The main driver of the improvement in developing country potential growth during the boom period was more rapid capital stock accumulation due to an higher than earlier investment to GDP ratio. In East Asia & the Pacific (EAP), fixed investment spending which was already high in the pre-crisis period, increased further causing the rate of growth of the capital stock to rise 1.2 percentage points between the pre-boom and boom periods (the smallest increase among developing regions). In other developing regions, with lower fixed investment rates, the increased investment during the boom had a more profound impact on the rate of capital stock accumulation, with capital stock growth rising by more than 4 percent in ECA and more than 3 percent in SAS and SST during the same period.
Changes in TFP growth played a less important role during the boom period rising only a bit or even falling in the case of ECA -perhaps suggesting that then marginal productivity of investment was declining. In contrast, improved total factor productivity was observed in the EAP (+0.4) and SAS (+0.3) regions -in turn largely driven by China and India.
With global, high-income and developing country GDP growth outpacing potential growth by 1.2, 1.0 and 2.1 percentage points p.a. respectively during the boom years, by 2007 all regions has large positive output gaps by 2007. The global output gap peaked at an unsustainable 3 percent of world potential output in 2007, and was reflected in overvalued asset prices, sharp increases in leveraged borrowing, increasing global imbalances and rising inflationary pressures -which culminated in the ensuing bust.
The bust (2007-2009)
During the bust, global and high-income country growth rates (peak-to-trough) declined by 4.5 and 4.6 percentage points respectively. In the Euro Area and Japan, growth rates fell by more than 5.2 percentage points, whereas the USA recorded a 4 percentage points decline.
Developing countries did not escape the global slowdown, their growth rates declined by 4.8% (5.5% if China is excluded) from the rates observed during the boom period. Among developing regions, the sharpest growth reversal was observed in the ECA region (-9.3 percent), followed by LAC (-5.5 percent), while growth in the other developing regions declined by between 3 and 4 percentage points. The only exception was MNA, where growth only declined by 0.5 percentage points.
With the exception of the ECA region, estimated potential growth rates declined less dramatically than GDP growth in developing countries. The main reason for the "resilient" potential output growth relates to the fact that the rate of capital accumulation did not slow as much in high-income countries -partly due to government stimulus efforts (notably in China), but also because most developing regions (with the exception of ECA) did not participate in the excesses of the boom period and therefore did not have to undergo the extensive balance sheet corrections observed in high-income countries. Moreover, TFP growth rates also remained largely unaffected by the financial crisis -partly reflecting the end-point assumption that TFP growth in the forecast period would equal the 1995-2005 average (which although generally lower than during the boom years, is also significantly higher than during the earlier period).
In ECA potential growth slowed by 1.1 percent due to substantial declines both in its rate of capital stock accumulation (-1.5% p.a.) and TFP growth (-0.7% p.a.).
Even though potential GDP growth also declined, the much more severe decline in actual GDP growth erased the earlier positive output gaps and pushed the output gaps back into negative territory (Table 2) . Potential output growth reversals (peak to trough) were larger in high income countries than developing ones with the latter benefited from resilient Chinese growth. In fact in EAP, output gaps did not even reach negative territory during the crisis. In ECA, the ensuing crisis had a profound impact, with a more than 12 percent reversal in output gaps from peak to the trough. A sharp reversal was also evident in LAC (6.8 percent), while the reversals in SAS and SST were much smaller at around 3½ percentage points, while output gaps in MNA remained largely unchanged.
Recovery (2009-2012)
Global growth recovered sharply from -0.6 percent p.a. during the bust to 2.9 percent p.a. on average during the "recovery" period, but the recovery speed varied across regions. With growth in high-income countries (particularly in Europe) being held back by financial and fiscal restructuring, the growth acceleration was primarily driven by developing countries as their growth accelerated from 4.0% p.a. over 2007-2009 to 6.7% p.a. during the recovery period. When China is excluded, the recovery among (remaining) developing countries is even more pronounced, with growth rates accelerating from 1.5% p.a. to 5.4% p.a. on average during the recovery phase.
Following the most severe growth slump during the crisis, the ECA region was also the region registering the largest GDP growth turnaround as growth accelerated by 6.6 percentage points. A sharp growth turnaround was also registered in LAC (4.6 percent) and SAS (2.3 percent), but the geopolitical conflicts resulted in MNA (-2.4%) growth continuing to decelerate. In EAP, the recovery was less spectacular as it maintained its fast growth even during the crisis period.
As developing countries increased their participation in global financial and trade networks, the cyclical component of their growth had become more synchronized with those of highincome countries. (This co-movement in business cycles is nicely illustrated in the evolvement of output gaps in the earlier figure 1).
As a result of increasingly synchronized business cycles, there was an expectation in some quarters that a developing country recovery will have to be premised on a recovery in advanced economies.
However, due to significantly higher potential growth rates in developing countries (6.8 percent) than in high-income countries (1.8 percent) over the 2009-2012 period, it was much easier for the former to emerge from an also more shallow recession (i.e. a less negative output gap than high-income countries).
Nonetheless, developing countries did not completely escape the consequences of the crisis and potential growth in developing countries slowed from 6.8 percent during the boom to 6.5 percent during the crisis, and then continued to decline further to 6.3 percent during the recovery phase. In most developing regions, potential growth slowed by about ½ percentage point during the recovery -but the reasons for the decline varied somewhat.
Capital stock growth slowed across developing regions except in EAP, while ECA was also negatively impacted by slower labor growth. However, with the exception of LAC, TFP growth (albeit mostly marginal), fell across developing regions, when compared to the bust period.
Developing country output gaps narrowed (and was almost closed in some instances), as growth recovered amidst a small decline in potential growth rates. In contrast, output gaps in advanced economies persist, as growth was not recovering (fast enough) to close existing output gaps.
Concluding remarks
A relatively simple methodology for estimating potential output in developing countries is presented, with parsimonious data requirements. Despite requiring strong assumptions to be made about important parameters, sensitivity analysis suggests that results are not overly sensitive to different assumptions. The methodology is preferred to a simple Hodrick-Prescott filter through GDP, in part because it allows for the economic role of greater or lesser investment to play through into potential output in an economically sensible fashion and thereby provides a policy handle with which to better understand developments.
The method generates estimates of output gaps that correspond relatively well to economic history, suggesting that developing countries were operating well above potential in the years before the crisis and that they recovered relatively rapidly afterwards. These estimates suggest that many middle-income countries entered the crisis period with large positive output gaps. The large monetary and fiscal stimuli that introduced post-crisis meant that despite sharp growth slowdown in 2009, output gaps in many of these countries remained elevated in 2010. Partly as a consequence efforts in middle-income countries to stimulate demand during the post-2010 period (for example in Brazil, India and Turkey) resulted in little additional output, instead generating increases in government indebtedness, inflation and current account deficits.
While estimates of potential output are notoriously difficult and imprecise, they can provide a useful anchor for forecasting and policy making. While other information may be needed, the combination of a positive output gap, rising inflation or current account balances should give policy makers pause to consider whether additional policy loosening is advidable.Much more work can be done to improve on these estimates. Data on actual wage and capital shares, which is available in some countries, should be brought to bear, while a more systematic approach to measuring the cohort effects of capital accumulation and using a more flexible pattern of depreciation can be envisaged without much additional data requirements. A close examination of the composition of developing country capital investment, coupled with an examination of high-income country estimates of sectoral depreciation rates could also serve to yield more precise depreciation rates.
Appendix : Potential GDP growth rates under different assumptions. 9 2007-2009 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 2009-2012 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 2012-2015 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5 Table C: lambda = 150 depreciation rate = 6% depreciation rate = 7% depreciation rate = 8% alpha 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.9
